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CSAE WPS/2010-261 Introduction
A great part of the [...] economy is decided in the corridors of the Ministry
of Economy and of the Central Bank [...]. It is more proﬁtable to spend
time in these corridors than in the manufacturing plant [...].
Quoted in Nogu´ es (p.23: 1989)
Export subsidies are illegal under WTO regulations. They can trigger retaliatory ac-
tion from trading partners, misalign prices and distort the allocation of resources. Even
when eﬀective, their impact is small and the direct ﬁscal cost of keeping them in place
can be unjustiﬁably large. Yet, export subsidies remain common in the developing
world.1
The case in favor of export subsidies is based on the argument that they can help a
country to achieve export expansion and diversiﬁcation of the economy towards manu-
facturing. They encourage a ﬁrm to undertake an activity that is costly, yet, assuming
positive spillovers from exporting to other ﬁrms, socially desirable. One of the practical
arguments against the use of export subsidies is that they are very easy to abuse, which
renders them ineﬀective in achieving their original goals (Nogu´ es, 1989).
First, there are government oﬃcials pandering to the ‘connected’ ﬁrms. Mobarak
and Purbasari (2006) use ﬁrm-level data for Indonesia and a unique data set identifying
a ﬁrm’s degree of connectedness to President Suharto to investigate the impact of nepo-
tistic relationships on the probability of obtaining import licenses for raw materials and
for commodities for sale in local markets. By conservative estimates, being connected
triples the likelihood of receiving a license relative to the ﬁrm’s competitors, and having
a member of the Suharto family on the ﬁrm’s board of management quadruples the
likelihood.
Second, the money is left for the discretionary use by the ﬁrm. If appropriate
auditing mechanisms are absent, as in most developing countries, ﬁrms may fail to spend
the additional resources on the activities fostering exports. Nogu´ es (1989) describes a
case in which a shipbuilding company drew on government export promotion funds
for several years before it became known that the company had not even started its
production. Rodrik (1993) cites an article from The Economist (August 14, 1993, pp.
37-38), in which a Kenyan ﬁrm, the sole recipient of a license to export gold and jewelry,
received US$ 54 million in export subsidies (amounting to 5 percent of Kenya’s total
exports). Not only did the ﬁrm get a subsidy of 35 percent instead of the legally allowed
1See the WTO World Trade Report 2006 for an overview of the current presence and relevance of
export subsidies in the developing world.
220, but the foreign buyers of its products either did not exist, or had never heard of
the ﬁrm.
Third, the export promotion schemes are often complex and this leaves them open
to misuse and abuse. Consider a sample list of export promotion measures operating
in Argentina during the 1980s: reimbursements for exports produced with sugar (a
product with important employment eﬀects in two provinces), for exports going to new
markets, for exports shipped through southern ports, for exports coming from Tierra
del Fuego, for exports shipped by the customs of Salta and Jujuy, reimbursements to the
enterprises that sign a contract with the government for a marginal increase of exports,
reimbursements for turnkey exports, etc. Leaving aside defaulting on commitments or
re-exports through a promoted port, a ﬁrm may establish barely functioning, but legal
factories in promoted regions. The only production that takes place there is the stick-
ing of labels. Tax reimbursement claims are, however, for the entire value of the output.
Such a complex system of subsidies and a questionable system to control their allo-
cation and use go a long way toward explaining why researchers have failed to ﬁnd
convincing evidence in favor of export subsidies. To borrow from Rodrik (p. 10: 1993),
“the received wisdom on export subsidies is that they have not been eﬀective”. We
believe that this may, at least partially, be explained by the fact that most of the work
on the impact of export subsidies has been done using country- and industry-level data
when in reality subsidies are negotiable on a case-by-case basis. As such, these ana-
lyzes have failed to take into account the potential misallocation or misuse of export
subsidies when looking at their eﬀectiveness.
This study is motivated by the substantial variation in government support received
by individual ﬁrms in Colombia during 1981-1991: while the median size of subsidies
per peso of export sales was around 8-10 percent, they could be as small as two and as
high as 20 percent, with a number of ﬁrms reporting subsidies in excess of a quarter
of export sales.2 We interpret such variation in subsidy rates as a sign that export
subsidies may not have been designed to support the industry or the region as a whole,
but to grant assistance to particular ﬁrms.
We address the following four questions: (A) how much of the variation in subsidies
can be explained by ﬁrm characteristics, commonly linked to the allocation rules, (B)
what type of ﬁrms obtain government support, (C) how can we measure ﬁrms’ ‘con-
nectedness’ inﬂuencing subsidy receipt without direct measures provided by the data
2The data we use are plant-level, so in the text, somewhat abusing language, the terms plant and
ﬁrm are used interchangeably.
3and (D) whether subsidies induce increases in export volumes and how the eﬀectiveness
of subsidies changes depending on our measure of ﬁrms’ ‘connectedness’.
Our empirical approach is as follows: we use a two-stage Heckman (1976, 1979) selec-
tion procedure to obtain ﬁrm-speciﬁc predicted subsidy amounts that are explained by
the characteristics that determine the ﬁrms’ eligibility for government support and its
amount. Drawing on the accounts of the discretionary allocation of subsidies in de-
veloping countries, we regard the discrepancy between the predicted and the observed
subsidy amounts as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s ties to government oﬃcials. Our evidence
suggests that allocation of subsidies is more complex than suggested by the literature
based on industry-level analyses. Subsidies are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, with diﬀerent factors af-
fecting the allocation and the amount decisions. Many ﬁrm characteristics mentioned
in the publicly available allocation rules do not seem to be important. Finally, we
ﬁnd that although, in general, subsidies exhibit a positive impact on export volumes,
this impact is diminishing in subsidy size and in the degree of a ﬁrm’s connectedness.
This ﬁnding thus suggests that export subsidies are ineﬀective when allocated to ﬁrms
based on criteria other than a ﬁrm’s potential to increase exports, such as a ﬁrm’s ties
to government oﬃcials.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
theoretical framework. Section 3 frames our analysis within the existing literature.
Section 4 lays out the regulatory environment for export subsidies in Colombia. Section
5 describes the data used in the analysis and provides a preliminary descriptive look at
the data. Section 6 discusses our empirical approach and Section 7 shows our results.
Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.
2 Theoretical Framework
Our framework is based on the dynamic model of participation in export markets in the
presence of sunk costs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Das et al., 2007), which postulates
that the decision to export depends on prior exporting experience.
A subsidy in our model is linked directly to the export volumes and represents an in-
crease in the price and, hence, the attractiveness of exports relative to domestic sales
(Hoﬀmaister, 1991). An empirical prediction following from this relationship is that a
subsidy will induce an increase in exports of the incumbent exporters.
Although a subsidy is conditional on the participation in export markets, it can, in
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nels. First, assuming ﬁrm-speciﬁc sunk costs of entry (for example, due to the diﬀerent
requirements for the product quality upgrading faced by individual ﬁrms), the afore-
mentioned increase in relative prices will translate into higher expected proﬁts in export
markets for some ﬁrms and will induce the marginal non-exporters to enter the export
market by loosening their ﬁnancial constraints. Second, in an environment with limited
capacity to monitor the disbursement and the use of subsidies, some ﬁrms will have in-
centives to report ﬁctitious export sales or even start exporting, if only to obtain access
to the government funds. However, it would be diﬃcult to disentangle empirically ﬁcti-
tious exports from those based on the optimal allocation decision of a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm.
Government funds are available for all exporters. This assumption, however, is based
on ﬁrm homogeneity and does not agree with the empirical observation that some ex-
porters (approximately 20 percent in our sample) do not receive government support.
There are several explanations for the observed pattern. First, in case of limited funds,
subsidies may be allocated based on the ‘ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served’ rule. In this case
subsidies are likely to be given to ﬁrms with better access to information regarding
the availability of funds. Alternatively, administrative hassle to obtain subsidies may
discourage some ﬁrms from applying for government support. We suggest that both
access to information and ability to deal with administrative hassles would be highly
correlated with the ﬁrm’s connectedness to government oﬃcials distributing the funds
and with the obtained subsidy amount. Empirically this would be reﬂected in diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy rates that cannot be justiﬁed by the various allocation
rules. Hence, we break down the variation in ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidy rates into two com-
ponents. The ﬁrst, perfectly legal, is driven by the complexity of the existing export
promotion schemes. In this case, ﬁrms will receive diﬀerent amounts of subsidies de-
pending on a ﬁrm’s industry, location, use of imported materials or machinery, or the
destination of its exports (see Section 4 for the institutional details of the export pro-
motion schemes in Colombia). The second component stems from the degree of the
ﬁrm’s connectedness to the government oﬃcials that distribute the funds. Bergstr¨ om
(1998), Bagella et al. (2003), and Blanes and Busom (2004) link the likelihood of a
ﬁrm receiving a subsidy to various measures of the ﬁrm’s political weight (for example,
lobbying capacity) and ﬁnd considerable discretion on the part of policy makers in the
allocation decisions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this component may be partic-
ularly important in Colombia. According to Pegurier and Salgado (2002), the policies
that gave governments discretionary power to set very uneven tariﬀs also allowed for
the arbitrary disbursing of subsidies: “There was no real quest for eﬃciency. Instead,
5as had happened to protectionist measures for industry, support for exports became the
source of rent through wasteful privilege-seeking activities.” (Pegurier and Salgado, p.
4: 2002).
There are two assumptions underlying our identiﬁcation strategy. First, we assume
that the amount of the received support is proportional to the degree of the ﬁrm’s
connectedness. That connected ﬁrms are not only more likely to receive subsidies but
also receive larger subsidies is true even in industrialized countries (Bertrand et al.,
2004). We have also seen above that it was certainly the case in Kenya. In 1998
Colombia’s TI Corruption rank was 79 (out of the participating 85 countries) with a
score of 2.2 (a perfect 10 describes a totally corruption-free country), thus ranking worse
than Kenya with an index of 2.5. Hence, our assumption is not entirely ungrounded.
We also assume that subsidies, assigned at the discretion of the oﬃcials disbursing the
funds, have no discernible positive impact on export performance. In fact, the impact
may be negative if subsidies result in costly competition among ﬁrms, whereby stronger
lobbying for a subsidy by one ﬁrm requires other ﬁrms in the industry to lobby harder to
get a given amount of support (Mitra, 2000) or if the ﬁrm spends considerable amounts
of resources on lawyers or bookkeepers that would be able to decipher the complicated
rules of the export promotion schemes and concoct ways of obtaining access to the
government funds. More formally, we are testing the assumption that






≥ Subsidy if Connectedness ≤ 0
< Subsidy if Connectedness > 0
Expression (1) says that the diﬀerence between the mean of exports conditional on the
‘true’ level of a ﬁrm’s subsidy rate Subsidy∗ and the the mean of exports conditional
on the observed level of the subsidy rate Subsidy and some variable Connectedness is
non-negative. We assume that the ‘true’ subsidy rate is the rate that would be observed
if subsidies were allocated purely based on the known and legal allocation rules. Hence,
we assume that the observed subsidy rate exceeds the ‘true’ subsidy rate whenever a
ﬁrm is connected. Therefore, we test the assumption that exports conditional on a
ﬁrm’s subsidy rate as well as a proxy for its connectedness is smaller or equal to the
level of exports that would be achieved if subsidies were allocated according to the
6eligibility of a ﬁrm as deﬁned by the government’s criteria. This means that subsidies
above the ‘true’ level have no or even a negative eﬀect on exports.
Based on this framework, we speculate that disproportionately large subsidy rates
are the result of nepotistic connections between ﬁrms and authorities in charge of
the allocation of subsidies and, hence, ineﬀective. We then test empirically whether
the responsiveness of the Colombian exporters to the subsidies is consistent with our
conjectures.
3 Related Literature
While theory predicts that export subsidies will increase exports, many practical issues,
such as the political environment, administrative capacity to monitor their distribution
and use, etc. may interfere with their impact. The search for evidence on their eﬀec-
tiveness has thus been left to empirical analyses.
There has been considerable empirical interest in the eﬀectiveness of export subsidies
in developing countries (Frank et al., 1975; Low, 1982; Jung and Lee, 1986; Nogu´ es,
1989; Hoﬀmaister, 1991; Arslan and van Wijnbergen, 1993; Faini, 1994; Moreira and
Figueiredo, 2002). The results of these studies are conﬂicting, with the verdict overall
coming out negative. Low (1982) documents the failure of the subsidy scheme in Kenya.
He attributes the disappointing eﬀect of the program to the poor implementation by,
and the signiﬁcant discretionary decision-making of, the bureaucrats in charge of allo-
cating government grants. Arslan and van Wijnbergen (1993) attribute improvements
in Turkey’s export performance to a depreciation of the exchange rate rather than
export subsidies. Nogu´ es (1989) concludes that export subsidies in Argentina only in-
creased allocative ineﬃciency, reinforced oligopolistic market structures, and provided
incentives for rent seeking. While he acknowledges some positive impact of export sub-
sidies in the case of Brazil (later supported by Moreira and Figueiredo, 2002), he argues
that the success relied crucially on accompanying macroeconomic stabilization and im-
port liberalization. He also points out that Mexico achieved a comparable positive
export performance without relying on costly subsidies. Similarly, Hoﬀmaister (1991)
ﬁnds a positive eﬀect of a tax credit scheme in Costa Rica on exports, but concedes
that, from a cost-beneﬁt point of view, export subsidies have been a disproportionably
costly way of achieving the rise in exports.
All of the aforementioned studies are based on industry-level data. Their major short-
coming is that they do not allow any conclusion with regard to ﬁrm-speciﬁc character-
7istics inﬂuencing the success of export subsidy schemes. However, ﬁrm-level analysis
of export subsidies is scarce for developed and non-existent for developing countries.
Bernard and Jensen (2004) test the eﬀect of export subsidies on exports of US ﬁrms by
including an ‘export promotion’ variable in their empirical speciﬁcation analyzing ﬁrms’
decision to export. Using export promotion expenditures at the state level, they ﬁnd
that subsidies are neither economically important nor statistically signiﬁcant. G¨ org et
al. (2006) analyze the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidies in encouraging export activity in
Ireland during 1986-2002 and ﬁnd that subsidies, when suﬃciently large, increase ﬁrms’
exports but do not inﬂuence their decision to export.
One should note that these two studies have been conducted on a set of countries with
a business environment unrepresentative of a developing country and a much better
administrative capacity to control the distribution of funds. We enrich the existing
ﬁrm-level evidence by providing an account of the eﬀectiveness of export subsidies in a
developing country with a limited capacity to monitor the disbursements of funds and
their intended uses.
4 The Regulatory Framework for Export Subsidies in Colombia
The export promotion scheme in Colombia during 1981-1991 was complex. Speciﬁ-
cally, the range of subsidies that have been available to individual ﬁrms included a
reimbursement for ﬁrms with exports exceeding the value of the imported raw mate-
rials; a reimbursement for ﬁrms importing at least 60 percent of the raw materials;
a reimbursement for ﬁrms importing machinery and equipment; a reimbursement for
ﬁrms exporting over 60 percent of their production; a reimbursement for ﬁrms that
have been participating in the export promotion schemes for at least three years; a re-
imbursement for ﬁrms located in the free economic zones (Santa Marta, Barranquilla,
Cartagena, Candelaria, C´ ucuta, Rio Negro, Eje Cafetero, Pac´ ıﬁco, Bogot´ a and Palma
Seca); an additional tax reimbursement in proportion to the total value of indirect
taxes. Finally, distinct reimbursements were given to ﬁrms with exports exceeding 2, 3
or 20 million US dollars. Export promotion funds were also available to ﬁrms operat-
ing in the domestic market which produced intermediate goods for exporters. However,
their number was very small in our sample (see Section 5). The bottom line is that the
rules varied by industry, location and, more importantly, by ﬁrm characteristics and
the exact subsidy amount was identiﬁed on a case-by-case basis by the taxation and
customs oﬃcers. Whereas our research would improve dramatically if we had exact
8value of the reimbursements assigned for each qualiﬁcation,3 we were unable to obtain
access to this information and have to resort to approximating the features of the ex-
port promotion scheme with the available information (see Section 6 for details).
The subsidies were paid in one installment in the period concurrent with the rewarded
exporting activity. A small portion of the sample also reports export taxes to be re-
imbursed by the government. We include those as part of the overall export incentive
package.
Before proceeding to the data analysis, we would like to emphasize the scheme’s po-
tential for abuse. D´ ıaz and Escudero (2002) report that the introduction of the Tax
Reimbursement Certiﬁcate CERT in 1983 was motivated mainly by the fraud opportu-
nities (reimbursement on ﬁctive exports) provided by the former certiﬁcate. Although
we do not have similar reports on other export promotion measures, it is nevertheless
plausible that they were just as prone to abuse. Moreover, it is unlikely that the new
tax reimbursement certiﬁcate was immune to fraud.
5 Data, Sample Selection and a Preliminary Look at the Data
Our data come from the 1981-1991 panel of the Annual Manufacturing Surveys (AMS).
The AMS data covers all manufacturing plants with ten or more workers.4 Among other
things, the AMS reports values of production, domestic and foreign sales, imported and
domestically purchased intermediate inputs, wage bills by skill category, capital stocks,
ownership, location, and subsidies. Roberts and Tybout (1996) provide a more com-
prehensive description of the data.
A look at the raw data reveals several patterns regarding the provision of subsidies in
Colombia. With the exception of food production, each of the export-oriented industries
3For example, instead of just knowing that a reimbursement was granted for imports of machinery, it
would be valuable to know whether a ﬁxed amount was granted irrespective of how much was imported
or whether it was a percentage of the value of the imported goods, whether it was based on the amount
of imports or on the ratio of imports to the output, etc.
4The manufacturing industries used in this study and their respective ISIC codes are: 311 (food
products), 312 (other food products), 313 (beverages), 314 (tobacco), 321 (textiles), 322 (clothing and
apparel), 323 (leather products, excluding clothing and shoes), 324 (leather shoes), 331 (lumber, wood
and cork products, excluding furniture), 332 (furniture), 341 (paper), 342 (printing and publishing),
351 (industrial chemicals), 352 (other chemicals), 353 (petroleum reﬁning), 354 (petroleum and coal
products), 355 (rubber products), 356 (plastic products), 361 (pottery), 362 (glass products), 369 (other
products of non-metallic minerals), 372 (non-ferrous metals), 381 (metal products), 382 (machinery),
383 (electronic machinery and equipment), 384 (transportation equipment), 385 (professional and sci-
entiﬁc equipments), 390 (miscellaneous manufacturing, such as jewelry, musical instruments, sporting
goods, etc.).
9is heavily subsidized - 70 to 80 percent of all exporters receive government assistance
and the percentage of exporters receiving subsidies remains fairly stable across years.
Graphs 1-4 suggest substantial variation in government support received by individual
plants: while the median size of subsidies per peso of export sales is around 8-10 per-
cent, it can be as small as two and as high as 20 percent, with many ﬁrms reporting
subsidies amounting to more than a quarter of export sales.5 The increase in subsidy
rates in 1984 and 1985 (Graph 4) is due to a signiﬁcant change in the composition of
government support during these years. Tax rebates and export pre-ﬁnancing became
unimportant, whereas direct subsidies received greater weight (Ocampo and Villar,
1995). Note that it is also during these two years that the subsidy rates exhibited the
largest variability, probably reﬂecting diﬀerent rates at which the ﬁrms complied with
the new rules.
The large number of outliers is striking. Although we clean the data to exclude erro-
neous observations and extreme outliers, we use a rather relaxed rule to deﬁne outliers
and choose to keep the information on the plants receiving unusually generous amounts
of subsidies relative to their export sales as depicted in Graphs 1-4.6 The main reason
behind this decision is reports on unclear and often discretionary rules to obtain export
subsidies in Colombia discussed above. We want to know whether such, potentially
inappropriate, discretionary handouts from the government aﬀect the recipient’s ex-
porting behavior (and we anticipate the answer to be negative).
A closer look at Graph 3 suggests that location may play a role in whether a plant is
likely to obtain a disproportionately high subsidy - Bogot´ a and Medellin seem to have
the highest number of ‘outliers’. Considering that Bogot´ a is the capital city of the
country and Medellin is the second largest city, geographically very close to Bogot´ a,
one may not discard the possibility that it is in these cities where the decisions on
public funding are of most politicized and discretionary nature. Both areas, of course,
are the epicenter of economic activity in the country and have the largest number of
plants both exporting and non-exporting. The ratio of exporters to non-exporters, or
percentage of exporters receiving subsidies, however, does not make these cities stand
out from the rest of the country.
The data set contains 1,423 plants which have exported at some point during the
5In this part we present the data on subsidies in terms of subsidy rates, i.e., the amount of govern-
ment support per peso of export sales. Since numerous factors determine absolute subsidy amounts,
looking at their variation without taking those factors into account, would be pointless.
6We deﬁne an outlier according to the rule Q1 − (2 × IQR)o rQ3+( 2× IQR).
10sample period. Only 146 of these have never received any subsidies. The rest have
obtained subsidies at some point, although not necessarily during each year of foreign
market participation - 301 plants report zero export subsidies along with positive export
volumes. Summary characteristics of the key variables are provided in Table 1. Apart
from the variation in the subsidy rates and slightly higher average export volumes,
there appears to be little diﬀerence between the plants in our sample.
6 Empirical Strategy
In this paper we strive to answer the following questions: (A) how much variation
in subsidies can be explained by ﬁrm characteristics that are commonly linked to the
allocation rules, (B) what type of ﬁrms obtain government support, (C) how we can
measure ﬁrms’ ‘connectedness’ inﬂuencing subsidy receipt without direct measures pro-
vided by the data and (D) whether subsidies induce increases in export volumes and
how the eﬀectiveness of subsidies changes depending on our measure of ﬁrms’ ‘connect-
edness’. We explain below how we tackle each of the questions.
A. How Much Variation in Subsidies is Explained by Firm Characteristics that are
Commonly Linked to the Allocation Rules?
We use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine the proportion of the total variation
that can be explained by the various allocation criteria. We apply ANOVA stepwise: we
start by the most obvious characteristic, exporting status; we continue by considering
other common criteria such as industry, location and year; we then add ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics described in Section 4 on the subsidies allocation rules in Colombia. Fi-
nally, we add ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to see how much of additional variation can be
explained by time invariant ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobservable factors. Each step tells us how
much of the total variation in subsidies can be attributed to the addition of the relevant
allocation rule. The goal of this exercise is to illustrate the degree of the explanatory
power contained in the various criteria.
B. Allocation of Export Subsidies
To determine which ﬁrms obtain subsidies we model the allocation rule as follows:
lnSubsidyijt = β0 + β1 lnExportsijt + β2 lnExports2
ijt + γZijt +  ijt (2)
11where Subsidyijt denotes subsidy amount of ﬁrm i in sector j at time t. Vector Z con-
tains information on the extent to which each ﬁrm satisﬁes the eligibility requirements
for the various reimbursements. Thus, to account for the features of the export promo-
tion scheme described earlier, we use a ratio of export volumes over the amount of the
imported raw materials; the amounts of purchased and used foreign raw materials and
the share of foreign raw materials in total (since diﬀerent allocation rules apply to these
three characteristics); the amount of imported machinery and equipment and export
intensity of the ﬁrm. Although we have information on the exact threshold export
amounts, beyond which the ﬁrms qualify for diﬀerent subsidy amounts, we ﬁnd that
including a linear and a quadratic term on export volumes is a better alternative to
a set of dummy variables identifying various thresholds. We use industry dummies to
account for the possibility that the government may have diﬀerential stimuli for some
goods (for example, ‘non-traditional exports’), as well as for the possibility that the
subsidies in some industries were introduced to neutralize the eﬀects of tariﬀs. More-
over, we use year dummies to control for the occasional modiﬁcations in the existing
export promotion measures.
We use the Heckman two-stage selection model to estimate Equation (2) (Heckman,
1976, 1979). The receipt of subsidies hinges on two factors: participation in exports
and decision to apply for subsidies. The decisions to export or not to export and to
apply or not to apply for subsidies were made by individual ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrms that
do not apply for subsidies constitute a self-selected sample. It is likely, for example,
that it is the ﬁrms which would receive very small subsidy amounts that choose not to
bother applying for them. A zero amount of subsidies in this case would not be a fair
reﬂection of what ﬁrms would have received if they had chosen to apply for subsidies.
An additional, and for this study more relevant, selection eﬀect would arise if some
ﬁrms receive subsidies because they have large error terms. That is, some ﬁrms may
receive a large subsidy not because they qualify for this amount, but because they have
a high value on some unmeasurable variable which is captured in the error term. In
our case, it is ties to the oﬃcials distributing the funds that go unmeasured into the
error term (of course, we do not exclude the possibility of other unmeasured or unmea-
surable factors that inﬂuence the amount received). Finally, we would like to allow for
the possibility that diﬀerent factors inﬂuence the decision to apply for subsidies and
the amount of the subsidies received. For these reasons we believe that the Heckman
model is an appropriate procedure to obtain the predicted value of the subsidy amount.
We posit that it would be unreasonable to assume that (1) the unmeasured factor does
not inﬂuence the amount received, (2) every variable inﬂuencing the decision to apply
for subsidies is controlled for, or (3) the same variables determine the decision to ap-
12ply for subsidies (or the probability of receiving them) and the amount of the subsidy
received. So, we follow the Heckman model, where in the ﬁrst stage we estimate an
equation determining the decision to apply for subsidies and in the second stage we
model an expected amount of the subsidy.
Technically, the Heckman model could be identiﬁed when the same variables are used
in the selection and in the outcome equations. In this case, identiﬁcation is only based
on the distributional assumptions about the residuals and is possible only due to the
non-linearity of the inverse Mill’s Ratio. The problem with relying on non-linearity as
the only source of identiﬁcation is that it may lead to imprecise estimates in the out-
come equation, especially if the selection equation is not very good at determining the
selection rule. Although, this is not the case in this study (the independent variables in
our selection equation have a very high explanatory power with the R-squared of over
77 percent), we include an additional variable that appears in the selection equation but
does not appear in the outcome equation: last period’s exporting status of the ﬁrm.
We motivate this choice theoretically: given high persistence in exporting behavior,
ﬁrms who exported a year ago are very likely to export in the current period, i.e., to
satisfy the main qualiﬁcation criterion of obtaining subsides. The main determinants
of the subsidy amount, however, are the export volume and the export intensity and
not the exporting status of the ﬁrm in the past.7
C. Estimating Connectedness
Ideally, we would like to have exact information on the nepotistic and political connec-
tions between the ﬁrms’ managers and the government oﬃcials distributing the funds.
The second best option would be to compute the exact amount of the subsidy for which
a ﬁrm is eligible and compare it to the obtained amount. To do this, we would need
precise allocation rules. That is, we would need to know the exact numeric subsidy
rate for each qualiﬁcation criterion (for example, three percent for exports of goods,
additional two percent for importing machinery, etc.) and the exact subsidy rate for
each threshold (for example, three percent for exports of goods below 10,000 pesos,
four percent for exports of goods amounting to more than 10,000, but less than 100,000
pesos, etc.) Unfortunately, such information is unavailable to us and we resort to ap-
proximating connectedness with the information we have at hand.8 Diﬀerent proxies
7Hysteresis models suggest that the persistence in exporting behavior is due to the existance of sunk
costs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997). These costs aﬀect the entry and exit patterns and not necessarily
the size of the trade ﬂows.
8Whereas we have no way of verifying by how much the amount of subsidies to which a ﬁrm is
eligible that we obtained empirically diﬀers from the amount computed numerically based on the
13of the ﬁrm’s connectedness have been proposed in the literature for data sets similar
to ours, i.e., void of an exact identiﬁer for the ﬁrm’s connectedness. Bergstr¨ om (1998)
and Bagella et al. (2003), for example, use a ﬁrm’s labor force to proxy for the ﬁrm’s
lobbying capacity. The results from Chaney et al. (2007) suggest that the variation in
a ﬁrm’s reported sales can act as a good proxy for the ﬁrm’s political connectedness
as politically connected ﬁrms provide signiﬁcantly lower quality sales data than their
unconnected peers.
We do the following: From the Heckman model described in part B above, we ob-
tain predicted values for export subsidies and compare these to the observed subsidy
amounts. We do so by taking the ratio of the observed to the predicted subsidy amounts.
This is our proxy for ‘connectedness’ to be used in the rest of the analysis. Formally, we
obtain   Subsidy from (2) and assume that   Subsidy = Subsidy∗. Therefore, our measure









≤ 1i f   Subsidy ≥ Subsidy
> 1i f   Subsidy < Subsidy
where Connectedness is bounded at zero.
It may appear intuitively unreasonable why some ﬁrms would obtain less than what
should be granted to them based on their characteristics and the allocation rules. We
explain it by incomplete information regarding the allocation rules and it is more than
plausible that lack of information is linked to a ﬁrm’s connectedness: the better con-
nected a ﬁrm, the more it is aware of its eligibility for government support and the best
connected ﬁrms are able to receive more than what they qualify for.10
D. Estimating Impact of Subsidies on Export Performance
To answer the question of how the receipt of disproportionately high subsidies aﬀects
their eﬀectiveness in stimulating exports, we estimate exporting behavior as a function
of government support in form of an unrestricted Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL)
model (in obvious notation):
precise allocation rules, we believe these measures to be highly correlated.
9We choose the ratio of received over predicted values because this presentation allows for a straight-
forward interpretation of our results. Obviously, we could reverse the ratio and preserve our ﬁndings.
10To check this conjecture, we also report results obtained from relaxing this assumption in Section
7.
14lnYijt = α0 + π0 lnYij,t−1 + π1 lnSubsidyijt + π2 lnSubsidyij,t−1 +
+π3 lnSubsidy2
ijt + π4 lnSubsidy2
ij,t−1 + β5Connectednessijt +
+π6Connectednessij,t−1 + π7 lnSubsidyijt × Connectednessijt +
+π8 lnSubsidyij,t−1 × Connectednessij,t−1 + π9Xijt + π10Xij,t−1 +
+ηj + φt + μijt (3)
The volume of exports for ﬁrm i in industry j and year t is regressed on the sub-
sidy amount, the interaction term identifying connected ﬁrms and ﬁrm characteristics,
where all terms enter contemporaneously as well as lagged one period. We draw on the
extensive literature on ﬁrms’ export supply to select additional controls for equation
(3). Xijt is a vector of variables that have been suggested as potentially important
determinants of exporting behavior and includes measures of plant size (logarithm of
employment), labor productivity (real output per worker), market share (ﬁrm’s sales as
a percentage of total industry sales), and time dummies. We also used the unrestricted
ADL estimates to test for the dynamic common factor representation of (3) imposing
the corresponding nonlinear restrictions on the parameters, but these restrictions were
rejected by the data (see Table 5).
Restricting ourselves to a short-run interpretation of the coeﬃcients obtained from
the dynamic model, the coeﬃcients π1, π2, π3 and π4 measure incremental returns to
attracting government support, whereas π7 and π8 measure how the impact of the
subsidies on the export promotion depends on a ﬁrm’s connectedness. The over-
all impact of subsidies on exports is π1 + π2 +2× π3 lnMean(Subsidyijt)+2×
π4 lnMean(Subsidyij,t−1)+π7Mean(Connectednessijt)+π8Mean(Connectednessij,t−1).
In case connectedness reduces the eﬀectiveness of subsidies in promoting exports, the
sum of the terms π7 ×Mean(Connectednessijt) and π8 ×Mean(Connectednessij,t−1)
will be negative.
The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the estimating
equation and the fact that we have a panel data set with large N and relatively short
T determines our choice of the estimation procedure. We estimate the dynamic model
with a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, based on Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) to obtain consistent estimators of Equation (3).
We use the diﬀerence GMM estimator, which uses ﬁrst-diﬀerences to instrument for
15levels in the estimation. This estimator has the advantage of purging all plant-level ef-
fects through the use of ﬁrst diﬀerences. It also allows to instrument for right-hand-side
variables that are endogenous. Given that subsidies are a direct function of exports,
this is particularly important in our case. Hence, all right-hand-side variables in Equa-
tion (3) are assumed to be endogenous, with the exception of the year dummies, which
are treated as strictly exogenous. For the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-
side, all available moment conditions are exploited, whereas less moment conditions are
used for all other regressors (for subsidies and connectedness we use lagged levels dated
t − 4 as instruments while for the control variables, we use lagged levels dated t − 2).
To increase eﬃciency, we use the two-step estimator and employ the small sample cor-
rection for the asymptotic variance proposed by Windmeijer (2005).11
It should be noted that by construction, the term Connectedness indirectly contains
information on the volume of exports, the dependent variable of the equation above.
It enters through the predicted subsidy amount which appears in the denominator of
the Connectedness measure, i.e., the ratio of the observed over the predicted subsidy
amounts. Note that this does not imply that the estimated impact of connectedness
on the eﬀectiveness of subsidies has to be either negative or positive by construction.
7 Results
Table 2 reports the ﬁndings from the ANOVA analysis and breaks down the total vari-
ation in subsidy rates in separate components. Thus, 46 percent of total variation
can be explained by the exporting status of a ﬁrm. Once we concentrate on exporters
only, exports are very bad at explaining the variation in the subsidy rates (adjusted
R-squared of 0.00). Industry and region are not much better. It is when we include
the year eﬀects that the adjusted R-squared increases to 13 percent. The next biggest
contributor to the explanation of the total variation in subsidy rates is a plant-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀect which increases the total amount of explained variation to 31 percent. The
point of this exercise is to show that much of the variation in subsidy rates remains a
mystery and cannot be accounted for by the linear relationship with information on the
degree to which a ﬁrm fulﬁlls the oﬃcial criteria set by the export promotion scheme,
such as the use of foreign raw materials, or with other observable ﬁrm characteristics.
Table 4 reports our more detailed ﬁndings regarding the factors that aﬀect the allo-
cation process. In column (1) we report the ﬁndings from the OLS regression that
ignores the censored nature of the dependent variable and the potential selection bias.
11To implement the estimator, we used Roodman’s (2005) xtabond2.
16In column (2) we report the ﬁndings from the probit regression in which we model the
decision of the ﬁrm to apply for export subsidies, with an additional regressor - previ-
ous period’s exporting behavior - that we believe to aﬀect the receipt of the subsidies,
but not their amount. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results of the Heckman
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. For comparison, in columns (5) and (6) we
report the ﬁndings from the Heckman two-step procedure. The two-step Heckman es-
timates a probit in the selection stage and OLS in the regression stage. The two-step
model provides a straightforward test for the presence of the selectivity bias. If the null
hypothesis of no selectivity bias is rejected, estimating both stages simultaneously by
Maximum Likelihood achieves more eﬃcient estimates than the two-stage procedure
and is therefore preferable. In our case, the Wald Test strongly rejects the null hy-
pothesis that the coeﬃcent of the Inverse Mills Ratio equals zero, which suggests the
presence of selection bias. Looking at the estimate of ρ, the correlation coeﬃcient, in
column (3), shows that there exists statistically signiﬁcant correlation between unob-
servables aﬀecting the amount of subsidies obtained and the allocation of subsidies.
For the sake of completeness, we also conduct estimations using Tobit because subsi-
dies are either zero or positive and ﬁnd that, with few exceptions, the signiﬁcance and
sign of coeﬃcients are not qualitatively diﬀerent from those obtained by the Heckman
Selection models. We estimate both a simple Tobit and a Random Eﬀects Tobit. A
comparison of those results indicates that the panel-level variance component is impor-
tant and that the panel estimator is diﬀerent from the pooled estimator.
The variables that consistently increase the propensity to receive export subsidies are
past exporting experience, current volume of exports (although the return to export
volumes is decreasing, as indicated by a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
squared term), amount of indirect taxes (which may be indicative of a tax refund el-
ement of the export subsidy scheme), ownership status (limited partnerships, and in
some speciﬁcations corporations, are more likely to obtain subsidies than other own-
ership forms), and ﬁrm’s location in the two of the four largest cities of the country -
Medellin and Bucaramanga - or in the rest of the country where some of the free eco-
nomic zones are located (we cannot identify more precisely the location of ﬁrms in the
free economic zones listed in the Section 4). The impact of the aforementioned factors
is distinct in the two stages of the allocation decision. Firms with a smaller market
share, for example, are less likely to receive subsidies, however, those that do, receive
larger amounts than bigger ﬁrms. Firms paying higher indirect taxes are more likely to
receive subsidies, but the amounts obtained are smaller. A ﬁrm’s location is important
for the propensity to receive subsidies, but not for the obtained amounts. In years
171983-1985 ﬁrms are no more likely to obtain subsidies than in 1981, but an average
recipient gets substantially higher amounts. Starting in 1987, there is some evidence of
decreasing subsidy amounts, which corresponds to the government attempts to reduce,
if not eliminate, export subsidies. By 1990, the amounts decrease below the 1981 level
and, by 1991, fewer ﬁrms apply and/or qualify for subsidies.
Curiously, none of the factors that we know to be part of the allocation rules, apart
from the volume of exports, aﬀects the propensity to obtain subsidies and only few af-
fect the obtained amounts. The amount of foreign raw materials is positively correlated
with the obtained amounts, but the share of foreign raw materials in total is negatively
correlated with the obtained amounts. This ﬁnding is in sync with the allocation of
subsidies to the ﬁrms that satisfy the minimal requirements on the use of imported raw
materials, but still favor domestic suppliers. This rule is common in developing coun-
tries, where governments attempt to reinforce backward and forward linkages between
the industries.
Overall, we ﬁnd that although ﬁrm characteristics explain variation in subsidy amounts
(Adjusted R-squared from the OLS regression is 0.78), many of the anticipated eﬀects
are insigniﬁcant. In Graph 5 we show a box plot of the ratio of observed over predicted
subsidies and in Graph 6 we plot the predicted subsidy amounts from the Heckman
ML estimation against the observed amounts. By construction, the ratio of observed
over predicted subsidies is centered around 1, with a long positive tail. The positive
outliers indicate the observations where ﬁrms obtain unusually high subsidy amounts
compared to what they should be getting based on their characteristics.
As explained earlier, we use this diﬀerence between the observed and predicted subsidy
amounts as a proxy for a ﬁrm’s connectedness to government oﬃcials. An implicit as-
sumption that we are making here is that all ﬁrms receiving subsidies are connected to
government oﬃcials, although to a varying degree. That is, the observations indicated
as blobs in the lower part of Graph 6 are ﬁrms that, although suﬃciently connected
to get some support, are not connected enough to obtain full information about the
availability of funds and allocation requirements, and hence, do not receive the amounts
that are due to them based on their characteristics.
Having constructed the ratio of the observed over predicted subsidies, we use it as a
proxy for connectedness to estimate Equation (3). The results of this analysis are re-
ported in Table 5, Column (1). First, we notice the relatively weakly persistent nature
of exporting behavior - the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and
18statistically signiﬁcant. It implies that an increase in exports in t − 1 by 10 percent
increases exports in t by around 2.3 percent.
We estimate the contemporaneous and lagged eﬀects of subsidies on exports. Table (5)
shows that we do not reject for columns (1)-(4) the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and
Bond, 1991) for the absence of second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
residuals, which means that the estimator is consistent. We ﬁnd that subsidies have a
positive impact on exporting behavior across all speciﬁcations (1)-(4), which is given
by the sum of the coeﬃcients for t and t − 1. This impact is decreasing in the amount
of the subsidy as implied by the statistically signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient of the
contemporaneous squared term of subsidies. In line with our hypothesis in Section 6,
in Column (1), the coeﬃcient on the interaction term for t is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant, whereas the coeﬃcient for t−1 is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. That
is, the eﬀectiveness of subsidies decreases as the gap between the observed and the pre-
dicted subsidy amounts increases. Overall, the estimated eﬀect of a 10 percent increase
in subsidies is to increase exports by 13 percent holding connectedness and everything
else constant, which is a sizeable eﬀect.12 At the same time, increasing connectedness
by 10 percent would lower exports by 50 percent, which is an even larger eﬀect. For the
control variables, we ﬁnd larger ﬁrms, measured by their total employment to export
more; a ﬁnding inline with theory (Melitz, 2003).
Since we are predominantly interested in the unusually high subsidy rates, we have
repeated the analysis in which we truncated the ratio of the observed over predicted
subsidies at 1. That is, we have allowed ‘connectedness’ to exist only for ﬁrms for
which observed amounts are higher than predicted. There is a serious issue with this
procedure, however. We need to make an arbitrary decision as to how to treat ﬁrms
with lower than predicted subsidy amounts. If we assign the value of zero for every ﬁrm
that is reporting a ratio below 1 (Column (2)), we assume that there is no diﬀerence
between the ﬁrms not receiving any subsidies or receiving less than what they should.
Making a distinction between them requires that we chose a diﬀerent value. We could
pull the value of the ratio down to the minimum observed ratio, 0.01, for all ﬁrms with
the ratio less or equal to one (Column (3)). Alternatively, we could pull the ratio up
to 1 (Column (4)). Experimenting with various truncation points supports overall our
ﬁndings from Column (1) that subsidies have a positive impact on exports and that
the impact becomes smaller as subsidies increase. The coeﬃcient on the interaction
term, however, loses its signiﬁcance (except for Column (3) in which the coeﬃcient of
12Obviously, in order to be able to ‘hold constant’ our measure of connectedness, we have to assume
that also the ‘true’ subsidy rate increases by 10 percent.
19the interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in time t and negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in time t − 1).
Using the same Colombian manufacturing data for a subset of ﬁrms used here,13 Das et
al. (2007) assess within a structural model the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of exports sub-
sidies on exports. They ﬁnd that allocating higher subsidies per-unit of exports results
in much larger increases of exports per peso spent than alternative subsidization poli-
cies which are targeted at the extensive margin through lump-sum transfers.14 While
we also ﬁnd that subsidies have a positive impact on the intensive margin, we ﬁnd as
well evidence that the eﬀect is decreasing in the amount of the assistance received and
depends negatively on the degree of the ﬁrm’s connectedness to government oﬃcials.
8 Conclusions
Economists are mostly opposed to export subsidies because they are (1) not well tar-
geted, (2) not easy to administer, and (3) open to rent-seeking. In this paper we have
explored the allocation of export subsidies in Colombia. Our evidence suggests that one
or all the conjectures put forward by economists could be in action. First, allocation
of subsidies is more complex than suggested by the literature based on industry-level
analyses. Subsidies are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, with diﬀerent factors aﬀecting the allocation and
the amount decisions. Many ﬁrm characteristics mentioned in the publicly available
sources regarding the allocation rules do not seem to be important. Finally, there is a
lot of unexplained variation in the subsidy rates obtained by various ﬁrms. Therefore,
generally positive eﬀects of export subsidies as a function of export volumes as found for
example in Das et al. (2007) may be undermined by rent-seeking activities of recipient
ﬁrms.
13Das et al. (2007) use data on ﬁrms belonging to ISIC codes 32 and 35.
14For their policy experiments, these authors use subsidy rates of 2, 5 and 10 percent.
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31 32 33 34 35 36 38 39
Deﬁnition of ISIC codes: 31 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco; 32 Textile, Wearing
Apparel and Leather Industries; 33 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Fur-
niture; 34 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing; 35 Manufacture
of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products; 36 Manufacture
of Non-Metallic Mineral Products, except Products of Petroleum and Coal; 37 Basic Metal In-
dustries; 38 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment; 39 Other
Manufacturing Industries.
24Figure 2: Box plot of export subsidy rates by ownership (1 - limited partnership, 2 -





















1 - Bogota 2 - Cali & Yumbo 3 - Medellin &  Valle de Aburra
4 - Manizales & Villarmaria 5 - Barranquilla & Soledad 6 - Bucaramanga
7 - Pereira & Santa Rosa de Cabal & Dosquebradas 8 - Cartagena 9 - Rest of the country
Export Subsidy Rate = Subsidy Amount / Export Sales
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Export Subsidy Rate = Subsidy Amount / Export Sales
Figure 5: Box plot of the ratio of observed over predicted subsidies













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 5: The Eﬀect of Export Subsidies on Exports - Diﬀerence GMM Results
Connectedness truncated
at 0 if at 0.01 if at 1 if
Predicted Subs.≤Observed Subs.
Dependent Variable: log(Exports) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Exports) t − 1 0.225** 0.026 0.275*** 0.070
(0.093) (0.093) (0.104) (0.088)
Ln(Subsidies) t 3.725*** 2.912*** 2.073*** 3.497***
(0.324) (0.159) (0.145) (0.903)
Ln(Subsidies) t − 1 -0.861* -0.295 -0.409* 0.071
(0.455) (0.353) (0.221) (0.734)
Ln(Subsidies) Squared t -0.141*** -0.233*** -0.136*** -0.200***
(0.019) (0.030) (0.021) (0.041)
Ln(Subsidies) Squared t − 1 0.026 0.031 0.006 0.005
(0.019) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036)
Connectedness t -3.701*** -0.553 -2.523*** 0.918
(0.457) (1.231) (0.368) (0.874)
Connectedness t − 1 1.313*** 0.952 1.511*** -0.509
(0.498) (1.177) (0.531) (0.653)
Connectedness×Ln(Subsidies) t -1.066*** 0.011 0.269*** -0.981
(0.349) (0.205) (0.080) (0.811)
Connectedness×Ln(Subsidies) t − 1 0.185 -0.198 -0.161** -0.186
(0.299) (0.170) (0.076) (0.563)
Ln(Total Labor) t 1.369*** 2.105*** 1.752*** 1.840**
(0.542) (0.748) (0.652) (0.765)
Ln(Total Labor) t − 1 -0.126 -0.925 -0.706 -0.939
(0.464) (0.659) (0.544) (0.573)
Ln(Market Share) t 0.165 1.277* 0.750 0.937
(0.442) (0.658) (0.558) (0.591)
Ln(Market Share) t − 1 -0.211 0.480 -0.279 -0.258
(0.388) (0.590) (0.459) (0.552)
Ln(Labor Productivity) t 0.369 0.294 0.647 0.562
(0.449) (0.626) (0564) (0.618)
Ln(Labor Productivity) t − 1 -0.107 -0.679 -0.633 -0.737
(0.458) (0.685) (0.539) (0.633)
Observations 9232 9232 9232 9232
Number of plants 1417 1417 1417 1417
AR(1) P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) P-value 0.482 0.953 0.162 0.583
Hansen J P-value 0.245 0.423 0.680 0.313
COMFAC 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes:
1. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
2. * indicates signiﬁcance at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%.
3. Regressions include constant and year dummies.
4. COMFAC is a minimum distance test of the common factor restrictions.
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